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Abstract
This paper provides a tractable continuous-time constant-absolute-risk averse (CARA)-Gaussian
framework to explore how the interactions of fundamental uncertainty, model uncertainty due
to a preference for robustness (RB), and state uncertainty due to information-processing con-
straints (rational inattention or RI) affect strategic consumption-portfolio rules and precaution-
ary savings in the presence of uninsurable labor income. Specifically, after solving the model
explicitly, I compute and compare the elasticities of strategic asset allocation and precaution-
ary savings to risk aversion, robustness, and inattention. Furthermore, for plausibly estimated
and calibrated model parameters, I quantitatively analyze how the interactions of model uncer-
tainty and state uncertainty affect the optimal share invested in the risky asset, and show that
they can provide a potential explanation for the observed stockholding behavior of households
with different education and income levels.
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“To form a long-term portfolio, investors must first think systematically about their preferences and
about the constraints they face. · · · · · One of the most interesting challenges of the 21st century will be to
develop systems, combining the scientific knowledge of financial economists with information technology and
the human wisdom of financial planners, to help investors carry out the task of strategic asset allocation.” –
John Y. Campbell (Invited Address to AEA and AFA, January 4, 2002)
1. Introduction
Intertemporal consumption-saving and portfolio choice is a fundamental topic in modern eco-
nomics. In the real world, ordinary investors face pervasive uncertainty, and have to make consumption-
saving-investment decisions in environments in which they are not only uncertain about both the
present or future states of the world (e.g., equity returns and uninsurable labor income), but are
also concerned about the structure of the model economy. It is therefore critical for us to under-
stand how rational investors make optimal financial decisions when facing various types of risks
and uncertainty. This paper provides a tractable continuous-time constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA)-Gaussian framework to explore how investors make strategic consumption-saving-asset
allocation decisions when they face both fundamental uncertainty (e.g., labor income uncertainty
or uncertainty about the equity return) and induced uncertainty. In this paper, we define induced
uncertainty as the interaction of model uncertainty due to a preference for robustness and state
uncertainty due to limited information-processing capacity.1
For most individual investors, human wealth, the expected present value of their current and
future labor income, constitutes a major fraction of their total wealth. However, moral hazard and
adverse selection problems prevent the emergence of markets that can insure investors against
their idiosyncratic labor income. Such market incompleteness has stimulated substantial research
interest in the behavior of precautionary saving. Both theoretical and empirical studies support
that we need to take the precautionary saving motive into account when modeling consumption
and saving behavior.2 The recent empirical evidence on household portfolios in the U.S. and ma-
jor European countries has also stimulated research in generalizing the single asset precautionary
saving model to allow for portfolio choice between risky and risk-free financial assets.3 For exam-
ple, Heaton and Lucas (2000) studied how the presence of background risks influences portfolio
allocations. They found that labor income is the most important source of wealth and labor in-
come risk is weakly positively correlated with equity returns. Viceira (2001) examined the effects
of labor income risk on optimal consumption and portfolio choice for both employed and retired
investors. Campbell (2006) outlined the field of household finance and argued that some house-
1Here we label model uncertainty or state uncertainty “induced uncertainty” because it is induced by the interactions
of the preference for robustness or information-processing constraints with fundamental uncertainty.
2See, for example, Caballero (1990), Carroll and Samwick (1998), and Kennickell and Lusardi (2005).
3The empirical research on household portfolios documents that the stock market participation rate was increasing
in the U.S. and Europe and the importance of the precautionary saving motive for portfolio choice. See Guiso, Jappelli,
and Terlizzese (1996) and Luigi, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2002).
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holds make serious investment mistakes, which lead to nonparticipation in risky asset markets
and underdiversification of risky portfolios. Wang (2009) examined optimal consumption-saving
and asset allocation when consumers cannot observe their income growth.4 These studies mainly
consider two key aspects of labor income risk: the variance and persistence of labor income and
the correlation between labor income and the equity return. In the presence of labor income, there
is an income-hedging demand when the equity return is correlated with labor income.5 In addi-
tion, non-tradable labor income leads to precautionary savings by interacting with risk aversion
when it is not perfectly correlated with the equity return.
In this paper, the household portfolio choice problem is revisited by assuming that individual
investors not only face fundamental uncertainty but also face induced uncertainty (model uncer-
tainty and state uncertainty). Model uncertainty and state uncertainty arise from two major types
of incomplete information: one is incomplete information about the distribution of the state tran-
sition equation, and the other is incomplete information about the true level of the state.6 Hansen
and Sargent (1995) first introduced the preference for robustness (RB, a concern for model misspec-
ification) into linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) economic models.7 In robust control problems,
agents are concerned about the possibility that their true model is misspecified in a manner that is
difficult to detect statistically; consequently, they choose their decisions as if the subjective distri-
bution over shocks was chosen by an evil agent to minimize their utility. As discussed in Hansen,
Sargent, and Tallarini (HST, 1999) and Luo and Young (2010), RB models can produce precaution-
ary savings even within the class of LQG models, which leads to analytical simplicity.8 Sims (2003)
first introduced information-processing constraint (rational inattention or RI) into economics and
argued that it is a plausible method for introducing sluggishness, randomness, and delay into
economic models. In his formulation agents have finite Shannon channel capacity, limiting their
ability to process signals about the true state. As a result, a shock to the state induces only gradual
responses by individuals. Another important implication of rational inattention is that attention is
a scarce resource that is important for productivity. Specifically, people may be less productive if
they are worrying about problems at home or distracted by other events that reduce productivity.
In other words, people would be more productive at work if they have higher income and can own
more distraction-saving goods and services at home (e.g., a good baby sitter).9 Because RI intro-
4See Campbell and Viceira (2002) for a recent survey on this topic.
5For example, if the labor income risk is positively correlated with the shock to the equity return, the equity is less
desirable because it offers a bad hedge against negative labor income shocks.
6In Section 5, I also examine the implications of another well-adopted type of imperfect state observation (incomplete
information about income) for optimal consumption-portfolio rule.
7See Hansen and Sargent (2007) for a textbook treatment on robustness.
8Luo, Nie, and Young (2012) briefly discussed the differences between CARA and RB within the discrete-time setting.
Although both RB and CARA preferences (i.e., Caballero 1990 and Wang 2004, 2009) increase the constant precautionary
savings demand, they have distinct implications for the marginal propensity to consume out of permanent income
(MPC).
9See Banerjee and Mullainathan (2008) for a discussion on the relationship among limited attention, productivity,
and income distribution.
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duces additional uncertainty, the endogenous noise due to finite capacity, into economic models,
RI by itself creates an additional demand for robustness. The distinction between these two types
of informational frictions can be seen from the following continuous-time transition equation of
the true state (st):
dst = (Ast + Bct) dt + σdBt,
where st and ct are state and control variables, respectively; A, B, and σ are constant coefficients;
and Bt is a standard Brownian motion. Under RB, agents do not know the true data generating
process driven by the random innovation (Bt), whereas agents under RI cannot observe the true
state (st) perfectly.
As the first contribution of this paper, a continuous-time theoretical framework is constructive
in which there are (i) two fundamental risks: uninsurable labor income and the equity return, (ii)
two types of induced uncertainty: model uncertainty (MU) due to the preference for robustness
and state uncertainty (SU) due to rational inattention, and (iii) CARA utility. The main reason that
I adopt the CARA utility specification is for technical convenience.10 It is shown that the models
with these features can be solved explicitly. In particular, when introducing state uncertainty due
to RI, I derive the continuous-time version of the information-processing constraint (IPC) proposed
in Sims (2003), and find the explicit expressions for the stochastic properties of the RI-induced
noise and the Kalman filtering equation. This paper is therefore closely related to the literature on
imperfect information, learning, asset allocation and asset pricing (see Gennotte 1986, Lundtofte
2008, and Wang 2009).11
Second, after solving the models explicitly, we can exactly inspect the mechanism through
which these two types of induced uncertainty interact and affect different types of demand for the
risky asset (i.e., the standard speculation demand and the income-hedging demand), the precau-
tionary saving demand, and consumption dynamics.12 In particular, I find that optimal allocation
in the risky asset and the precautionary saving demand are more sensitive to CARA than RB, and
are more sensitive to RB than RI when investors are not highly information-constrained.
Third, after calibrating the RB parameter using the detection error probabilities (DEP, or p), I
10A few papers find closed-form solutions in CARA models with uninsurable labor income. For example, Svensson
and Werner (1993) study an infinite horizon consumption-investment model with normally distributed income. It is
well known that there is no closed-form solution if we move away from the CARA specification (e.g., if we adopt the
constant relative risk aversion or CRRA utility) and explicitly model uninsurable labor income in the infinite-horizon
consumption-portfolio choice model in the vein of Merton (1969, 1971). It is also worth noting that Bliss and Pani-
girtzoglou (2004) found evidence from option prices that the CARA specification provides a better representation of
preferences than the CRRA specification.
11It is also shown that the RI model is equivalent to the traditional signal extraction (SE) model with exogenously
specified noises in the sense that they lead to the same model dynamics when the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and finite
capacity satisfy some restriction. In other words, we can provide a microfoundation (limited information-processing
constraint) for the exogenously specified SNR in the traditional SE models.
12Uppal and Wang (2002), Maenhout (2004, 2006), Cao, Wang, and Zhang (2005), Liu, Pan, and Wang (2005), and Liu
(2010) examined how model uncertainty affects portfolio choices and/or asset prices.
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explore how RI affects the calibrated parameter value of RB for given values of p. Specifically,
I find that in the presence of model uncertainty, the correlation between the equity return and
undiversified labor income not only affects the hedging demand for the risky asset, but also affects
its standard speculation demand. The key reason is that given the same value of p, the correlation
between labor income and the equity return increases the calibrated value of RB and thus reduces
the optimal share invested in the risky asset.
Finally, the model presented in this paper has some testable implications. As discussed in
Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), Haliassos and Michaelides (2000), and Campbell (2006), the empiri-
cal evidence on the correlation between labor income and equity returns for different population
groups is difficult to reconcile with the observed stockholding behavior. Davis and Willen (1999)
estimated that the correlation is between 0.1 and 0.3 for college-educated males and is about−0.25
for male high school dropouts. Heaton and Lucas (1999) found that the correlation between the
entrepreneurial risk and the equity return was about 0.2. Since negative correlation between earn-
ings and equity returns implies increased willingness to invest in the risky asset, less-educated
investors should be more heavily invested in the stock market while college graduates and en-
trepreneurs should put less wealth in the stock market. In contrast, the empirical evidence on
stock market participation shows a significantly positive correlation between education level and
stockholding.13 I show that incorporating induced uncertainty due to the interaction of RB and RI
can have the potential to help reconcile the model with the empirical evidence. Specifically, poorer
and less well-educated investors probably face greater induced uncertainty (state uncertainty and
model uncertainty); consequently, they rationally choose to invest less in the stock market even if
the correlation between their labor income and equity returns is negative and they have stronger
incentive to hedge against their earnings risk.
This paper contributes to the literature on incomplete-markets consumption-saving-portfolio
decisions under uncertainty, and is closely related to Maenhout (2004) and Wang (2009). Maenhout
(2004) explored how model uncertainty due to a preference for robustness affects optimal portfo-
lio choice, and showed that robustness significantly reduces the demand for the risky asset and
increases the equilibrium equity premium. Wang (2009) studied the effects of incomplete infor-
mation about the income growth rate on the agent’s consumption, saving, and portfolio choice in
an incomplete-market economy. He found that the estimation risk arising from the agent’s learn-
ing process leads to additional precautionary savings demand and the agent can partially hedge
against both the income risk and estimation risk by investing in the risky asset. Unlike Maenhout
(2004), the present paper explores how the interaction of model uncertainty and state uncertainty
affects the consumption-saving-portfolio decisions in the presence of uninsurable labor income.
The model presented in this paper can therefore be used to study the relationship between the cor-
13Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) found that the share invested in the stock market is substantially larger among those
with at least a college degree compared to those with less than high school education at all income levels.
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relation between the labor income risk and the equity return risk and the stockholding behavior.
Unlike Wang (2009), this paper considers model uncertainty due to robustness. In addition, the
state uncertainty considered in this paper is not only from the income process but also from the
equity return. Finally, this paper is also related with the work on robust/risk-sensitive/rational
inattention permanent income models such as Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999), Luo (2008),
and Luo and Young (2010). The key difference between this paper and the papers mentioned above
is that they adopted the linear-quadratic permanent income framework with constant asset returns
to study consumption and saving dynamics and did not consider the portfolio choice problem. In
addition, they can establish the observational equivalence between the discount factor and the ro-
bustness preference. In contrast, in the present paper, this observational equivalence breaks down
in the presence of the portfolio choice.
This remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the setup of a continuous-
time consumption and portfolio choice model with uninsurable labor income. Section 3 introduces
RB into the benchmark model and examines the theoretical and empirical implications of RB on
consumption-portfolio rules and precautionary savings using calibrated RB parameters. Section 4
examines how the interactions of RB and RI due to limited information-processing constraint affect
robustly strategic consumption-portfolio rules. Section 5 discusses another type of informational
frictions, incomplete information about individual income components, and compares it with the
RI hypothesis. Section 6 concludes.
2. A Continuous-time Consumption-Portfolio Choice Model with Uninsurable Labor
Income
In this paper, we follow Wang (2009) and consider a continuous-time version of the Caballero-
type model (1990) with portfolio choice. The typical consumer facing uninsurable labor income
in the model economy makes optimal consumption-saving-asset allocation decisions. Specifically,
we assume that the consumer can access: one risk-free asset and one risky asset, and also re-
ceive uninsurable labor income. Labor income (yt) is assumed to follow a continuous-time AR(1)
(Ornstein-Uhlenbeck) process:
dyt = ρ
(
µ
ρ
− yt
)
dt + σydBy,t, (1)
where the unconditional mean and variance of income are y = µ/ρ and σ2y / (2ρ), respectively; the
persistence coefficient ρ governs the speed of convergence or divergence from the steady state;14
By,t is a standard Brownian motion on the real line R; and σy is the unconditional volatility of the
14If ρ > 0, the income process is stationary and deviations of income from the steady state are temporary; if ρ ≤ 0,
income is non-stationary. The ρ = 0 case corresponds to a simple Brownian motion without drift. The larger ρ is, the
less y tends to drift away from y. As ρ goes to ∞, the variance of y goes to 0, which means that y can never deviate from
y.
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income change over an incremental unit of time.
The agent can invest in both a risk-free asset with a constant interest rate r and a risky asset
(i.e., the market portfolio) with a risky return ret . The instantaneous return dr
e
t of the risky market
portfolio over dt is given by
dret = (r + pi) dt + σedBe,t, (2)
where pi is the market risk premium; Be,t is a standard Brownian motion; and σe is the standard
deviation of the market return. Let ρye be the contemporaneous correlation between the labor in-
come process and the return of the risky asset. When ρye = 0, the labor income risk is idiosyncratic
and is uncorrelated with the risky market return; when ρye = 1, the labor income risk is perfectly
correlated with the risky market return. The agent’s financial wealth evolution is then given by
dwt = (rwt + yt − ct) dt + αt (pidt + σedBe,t) , (3)
where αt denotes the amount of wealth that the investor allocates to the market portfolio at time t.
The typical consumer is assumed to maximize the following expected lifetime utility:
E0
[ˆ ∞
t=0
exp (−δt) u(ct)dt
]
,
subject to (3). The utility function takes the CARA form: u(ct) = − exp (−γct) /γ, where γ > 0 is
the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.15 To simplify the model, we define a new state variable,
st:
st ≡ wt + ht,
where ht is human wealth at time t and is defined as the expected present value of current and
future labor income discounted at the risk-free interest rate r:
ht ≡ Et
[ˆ ∞
t
exp (−r (s− t)) ysds
]
.
For the given income process, (1), ht = 1r+ρyt +
µ
r(r+ρ) .
16 Following the state-space-reduction ap-
proach proposed in Luo (2008) and using this new state variable, we can rewrite (3) as
dst = (rst − ct + piαt) dt + σdBt, (4)
15It is well-known that the CARA utility specification is tractable for deriving the consumption function or optimal
consumption-portfolio rules in different settings. See Merton (1969), Caballero (1990), Svensson and Werner (1993), and
Wang (2004, 2009).
16Here we need to impose the restriction that r > −ρ to guarantee below the finiteness of human wealth.
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where σdBt = σeαtdBe,t + σsdBy,t, σs = σy/ (r + ρ), and
σ =
√
σ2e α
2
t + σ
2
s + 2ρyeσsσeαt (5)
is the unconditional variance of the innovation to st.17
In this benchmark full-information rational expectations (FI-RE) model, we assume that the
consumer trusts the model and observes the state perfectly, i.e., there is no model uncertainty and
no state uncertainty. The value function is denoted by J (st). The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)
equation for this optimizing problem can be written as:
0 = sup
ct,αt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (st) +D J (st)
]
,
where
D J (st) = Js (rst − ct + piαt) + 12 Jss
(
σ2e α
2
t + σ
2
s + 2ρyeσsσeαt
)
. (6)
Finally, the transversality condition (TVC), limt→∞ E |exp (−δt) Jt| = 0, holds (see Appendix 7.1
for the proof). Solving the above HJB subject to (4) leads to the following optimal portfolio-
consumption rules:18
α =
pi
rγσ2e
− ρyeσsσe
σ2e
, (7)
and
ct = rst +
δ− r
rγ
+
pi2
2rγσ2e
− piρyeσsσe
σ2e
− Γ, (8)
where
Γ ≡ 1
2
rγ
(
1− ρ2ye
)
σ2s , (9)
is the investor’s precautionary saving demand. The first term in (7) is the standard speculation
demand for the risky asset, which is positively correlated with the risk premium of the risky asset
over the risk-free asset and is negatively correlated with the degree of risk aversion and the vari-
ance of the return to the risky asset. The second term in (7) is the labor income hedging demand of
the risky asset. When ρye 6= 0, i.e., the income shock is not purely idiosyncratic, the desirability of
the risky asset depends not only on its expected excess return relative to its variance, but also on its
ability to hedge consumption against bad realizations of labor income. Following the literature of
precautionary savings, we measure the demand for precautionary saving as the amount of saving
17The main advantage of this state-space-reduction approach is to allow us to solve the model with both model
uncertainty and state uncertainty explicitly and help better inspect the mechanism by which the informational frictions
interact and affect optimal consumption-portfolio rules. It is worth noting that if we only consider model uncertainty,
the reduced univariate model and the original multivariate model are equivalent in the sense that they lead to the same
consumption-portfolio rules. The detailed proof is available from the online appendix.
18This solution is similar to that obtained in Model I of Wang (2009).
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due to the interaction of the degree of risk aversion and non-diversifiable labor income risk.19 If
labor income is perfectly correlated with the return to the risky asset (i.e., ρye = ±1), the market is
complete and the consumer can fully hedge his or her labor income risk; consequently, his or her
demand for precautionary saving is 0.
3. Incorporating Model Uncertainty due to Robustness
3.1. Modeling Robustness
As argued in Hansen and Sargent (2007), the simplest version of robustness considers the question
of how to make optimal decisions when the decision-maker does not know the true probability
model that generates the data. The main goal of introducing robustness is to design optimal poli-
cies that not only work well when the reference (or approximating) model governing the evolution
of the state variables is the true model, but also perform reasonably well when there is some type
of model misspecification. To introduce robustness into our model proposed above, we follow the
continuous-time methodology proposed by Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (2003) (henceforth,
AHS) and adopted in Maenhout (2004) to assume that consumers are concerned about the model
misspecifications and take Equation (4) as the approximating model.20 The corresponding distort-
ing model can thus be obtained by adding an endogenous distortion υ (st) to (4):
dst = (rst − ct + piαt) dt + σ (συ (st) dt + dBt) . (10)
As shown in AHS (2003), the objective D J defined in (6) plays a crucial role in introducing robust-
ness. D J can be thought of as E [dJ] /dt and is easily obtained using Itô’s lemma. A key insight of
AHS (2003) is that this differential expectations operator reflects a particular underlying model for
the state variable. The consumer accepts the approximating model, (4), as the best approximating
model, but is still concerned that it is misspecified. He or she therefore wants to consider a range
of models (i.e., the distorted model, (10)) surrounding the approximating model when computing
the continuation payoff. A preference for robustness is then achieved by having the agent guard
against the distorting model that is reasonably close to the approximating model. The drift adjust-
ment υ (st) is chosen to minimize the sum of (i) the expected continuation payoff adjusted to reflect
the additional drift component in (10) and (ii) an entropy penalty:
inf
υ
[
D J + υ (st) σ2 Js + 1
ϑt
H
]
, (11)
19Note that hedging with the risky asset
(
ρye 6= 0
)
reduces the consumer’s precautionary saving demand.
20As argued in Hansen and Sargent (2007), the agent’s commitment technology is irrelevant under RB if the evolution
of the state is backward-looking. We therefore do not specify the commitment technology of the consumer in the RB
models of this paper.
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where the first two terms are the expected continuation payoff when the state variable follows
(10), i.e., the alternative model based on drift distortion υ (st), H = (υ (st) σs)2 /2 is the relative
entropy or the expected log likelihood ratio between the distorted model and the approximating
model and measures the distance between the two models,21 and 1/ϑt is the weight on the entropy
penalty term.22 ϑt is fixed and state-independent in AHS (2003); whereas it is state-dependent in
Maenhout (2004). The key reason for using a state-dependent counterpart ϑt in Maenhout (2004) is
to assure the homotheticity or scale invariance of the decision problem with the CRRA utility func-
tion.23 In this paper, we also specify that ϑt is state-dependent (ϑ (st)) in the CARA-Gaussian set-
ting. The main reason for this specification is to guarantee homotheticity, which makes robustness
not diminish as the value of the total wealth increases.24 Note that the evil agent’s minimization
problem, (11), becomes invariant to the scale of total resource, st when using the state-dependent
specification of ϑt.
Applying these results in the above model yields the following HJB equation under robustness:
sup
ct,αt
inf
υt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (st) +D J (st) + υ (st) σ2 Js + 12ϑ (st)υ
2 (st) σ2
]
. (12)
Finally, the transversality condition (TVC), limt→∞ E |exp (−δt) Jt| = 0, holds at optimum. Solving
first for the infimization part of (12) yields:
υ∗ (st) = −ϑ (st) Js,
where ϑ (st) = −ϑ/J (st) > 0 and ϑ is a constant (see Appendix 7.1 for the derivation). Following
Uppal and Wang (2003) and Liu, Pan, and Wang (2005), here we can also define “1/J (st)” in the
ϑ (st) specification as a normalization factor that is introduced to convert the relative entropy (i.e.,
the distance between the approximating model and the distorted model) to units of utility so that
it is consistent with the units of the expected future value function evaluated with the distorted
model. It is worth noting that adopting a slightly more general specification, ϑ (st) = −ϕϑ/J (st)
where ϕ is a constant, does not affect the main results of the paper. The reason is as follows. We
can simply define a new constant, ϑ˜ = ϕϑ, and ϑ˜, rather than ϑ, will enter the decision rules. Using
21Define qt ≡ −
´ t
0 υ (st) σsdBs − 12
´ t
0 (υ (st) σs)
2 ds, we have the following Radon-Nikodym derivative:
dQ
dP
|Ft=qt
for each time t, where Q and P are the distributions of the distorted model and the approximating model, respectively.
22The last term in (11) is due to the consumer’s preference for robustness. Note that the ϑt = 0 case corresponds
to the standard expected utility case. This robustness specification is called the multiplier (or penalty) robust control
problem. We will discuss another closely related robustness specification, the constraint robust control problem, in the
next subsection. See AHS (2003) and Hansen, Sargent, Turmuhambetova, and Williams (2006) (henceforth, HSTW) for
detailed discussions on these two robustness specifications.
23See Maenhout (2004) for detailed discussions on the appealing features of “homothetic robustness”.
24Note that the impact of robustness wears off if we assume that ϑt is constant. It is clear from the procedure of solving
the robust HJB proposed. (See Appendix 7.1 for the details.)
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a given detection error probability, we can easily calibrate the corresponding value of ϑ˜ that affects
the optimal consumption-portfolio rules.25
Because ϑ (st) > 0, the perturbation adds a negative drift term to the state transition equation
because Js > 0. Substituting for υ∗ in (12) gives:
sup
ct,αt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (st) + (rst − ct + piαt) Js + 12σ
2 Jss − 12ϑ (st) σ
2 J2s
]
. (13)
3.2. Theoretical Implications
Following the standard procedure, we can then solve (13) and obtain the optimal consumption-
portfolio rules under robustness. The following proposition summarizes the solution:
Proposition 1. Under robustness, the optimal consumption and portfolio rules are
c∗t = rst +
δ− r
rγ
+
pi2
2rγ˜σ2e
− piρyeσsσe
σ2e
− Γ, (14)
and
α∗ =
pi
rγ˜σ2e
− ρyeσsσe
σ2e
, (15)
respectively, where the effective coefficient of absolute risk aversion γ˜ is defined as: γ˜ ≡ (1+ ϑ) γ, Ψ =
(δ− r) / (rγ) captures the dissavings effect of relative impatience, and the precautionary savings demand,
Γ, is:
Γ =
1
2
rγ˜
(
1− ρ2ye
)
σ2s . (16)
Finally, the worst possible distortion can be written as:
υ∗ = −rγϑ. (17)
Proof. See Appendix 7.1.
From (14), it is clear that robustness does not change the marginal propensity to consume out of
permanent income (MPC), but affects the amount of precautionary savings (Γ). In other words, in
the continuous-time setting, consumption is not sensitive to unanticipated income shocks. This
conclusion is different from that obtained in the discrete-time robust-LQG permanent income
model, in which the MPC is increased via the interaction between RB and income uncertainty
and consumption is more sensitive to unanticipated shocks.26
25See Section 7.2 for the detailed procedure to calibrate the value of ϑ using the detection error probabilities.
26See HST (1999) and Luo and Young (2010) for detailed discussions on how RB affects consumption and precaution-
ary savings in the discrete-time robust-LQG models.
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Expression (15) shows that RB reduces the optimal speculation demand by a factor, 1 + ϑ, but
does not affect the hedging demand of the risky asset. In other words, RB increases the relative
importance of the income hedging demand to the speculation demand by increasing the effective
coefficient of absolute risk aversion (γ˜). Expression (16) shows that the precautionary savings
premium increases with the degree of robustness (ϑ) by increasing the value of γ˜ and interacting
with two types of fundamental uncertainty: labor income uncertainty (σ2s ) and the correlation
between labor income and the equity return (ρye). An interesting question here is the relative
importance of RB (ϑ) and CARA (γ) in determining the precautionary savings premium, holding
other parameters constant. We can use the elasticities of precautionary saving as a measure of their
importance. Specifically, using (16), we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2. The relative sensitivity of precautionary saving to robustness (RB, ϑ) and CARA (γ) can
be measured by:
µγϑ ≡ eγeϑ =
1+ ϑ
ϑ
> 1, (18)
where eϑ ≡ ∂Γ/Γ∂ϑ/ϑ = and eγ ≡ ∂Γ/Γ∂γ/γ are the elasticities of the precautionary saving demand to RB and CARA,
respectively. (18) means that the precautionary savings demand is more sensitive to absolute risk aversion
measured by γ than RB measured by ϑ. Note that Expression (18) can also measure the relative sensitivity
of portfolio choice to RB and CARA.
Proof. Using (15) and (16), the proof is straightforward.
Using (18), it is simple to show that ∂µγϑ/∂ϑ > 0, which means that µγϑ is increasing with
the degree of RB, ϑ. To fully explore the quantitative effects of robustness on portfolio choice and
precautionary saving, we need to calibrate ϑ using the detection error probability approach (DEP)
proposed in Hansen, Sargent, and Wang (henceforth, HSW, 2002), AHS (2003), and Hansen and
Sargent (Chapter 9, 2007). In the next subsection, we will examine the relative importance of RB to
CARA quantitatively after calibrating ϑ using the U.S. data.
Proposition 3. The observational equivalence between the discount factor and robustness established in
the discrete-time Hansen-Sargent-Tallarini (1999) does not hold in our continuous-time CARA-Gaussian
model.
Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (1999) (henceforth, HST) show that the discount factor and the
concern about robustness are observationally equivalent in the sense that they lead to the same con-
sumption and investment decisions in a discrete-time LQG permanent income model. The reason
is that introducing a concern about robustness increases savings in the same way as increasing the
discount factor, so that the discount factor can be changed to offset the effect of a change in RS or
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RB on consumption and investment.27 In contrast, in the continuous-time CARA-Gaussian model
with portfolio choice discussed in this section, the observational equivalence between the discount
rate and the RB parameter no longer holds. This result can be readily obtained by inspecting the
explicit expressions of consumption, precautionary savings, and portfolio choice, (14)-(16). The
main reason for this result is that the preference for robustness governed by ϑ affects the portfolio
rule, while the discount rate (δ) has no impact on the portfolio rule in this Merton-type solution.
It is well known that this type of intertemporal consumption-portfolio choice models leads to my-
opic portfolio rules, and the discount rate does not play a role in affecting asset allocation. It is
straightforward to show that once we rule out the risky asset from our model, we can re-establish
the observational equivalence between robustness and patience. Specifically, for given r and γ,
when δ = r + 0.5 (rγ)2 ϑσs, this RB model is observationally equivalent to the FI-RE model with a
lower discount rate (δ = r) in the sense that they lead to the same consumption-saving decisions.28
In summary, although both the discount rate (δ) and ϑ affect the constant term in the consumption
function, and their observational equivalence can be established in the sense that they generate the
same value of the constant term, they imply different portfolio choices and thus break down the
observational equivalence between δ and ϑ.29
Following HSTW (2006) and Hansen and Sargent (2007), we could use the following constraint
formulation of the above RB problem:
sup
ct,αt
inf
υt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (st) +D J (st) + υ (st) σ2 Js
]
, (19)
subject to
1
2
(υ (st) σ)
2 ≤ η, (20)
where η > 0 measures the consumer’s tolerance for model misspecification. It is clear from the
above constraint that the worst-case distortion is:
υ∗ (st) = −
√
2η
σ
< 0.
Substituting this expression into (19), we can reduce the robust HJB equation to the following HJB
equation:
sup
ct,αt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (st) +D J (st)−
√
2ησJs
]
. (21)
27As shown in HST (1999), the two models have different implications for asset prices because continuation valuations
would change as one alters the values of the discount factor and the robustness parameter within the observational
equivalence set.
28Note that in the case without the risky asset, the consumption function and the precautionary saving demand
become c∗t = rst +Ψ− Γ and Γ = 0.5rγ˜σ2s , respectively.
29Note that the precautionary saving demand is included in the constant term.
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However, given that σ =
√
σ2e α
2
t + σ
2
s + 2ρyeσsσeαt, since both σ and σ2 appear in (21), there is no
explicit solution for (21). As argued in Lei (2001) and HSTW (2006), the risk is second-order in the
multiplier formulation because the robustness parameter interacts with the risk-aversion param-
eter, and they are multiplied by the variance σ2. In other words, the second-order risk aversion
is now enhanced by the presence of robustness measured by ϑ. In contrast, in the constraint for-
mulation, the robustness term,
√
2ησ, is proportional to the standard deviation σ. In other words,
η measures the amount of the first-order risk aversion. In the online appendix, I show that the
multiplier and constraint formulations are observationally equivalent in the sense that they lead to
the same portfolio rule and the same level of the worst-case distortion when ϑ and η satisfy some
restriction in special cases in which ρye = ±1 or σs = 0. To keep the model tractable, following the
literature I focus on the multiplier formulation of RB in the subsequent analysis.
3.3. Quantitative Implications
To fully explore how RB affects the joint behavior of portfolio choice, consumption, and labor
income, we adopt the calibration procedure outlined in HSW (2002) and AHS (2003) to calibrate the
value of the RB parameter (ϑ) that governs the degree of robustness. Specifically, we calibrate ϑ by
using the method of detection error probabilities (DEP) that is based on a statistical theory of model
selection. We can then infer what values of ϑ imply reasonable fears of model misspecification for
empirically-plausible approximating models. The model detection error probability denoted by p
is a measure of how far the distorted model can deviate from the approximating model without
being discarded; low values for this probability mean that agents are unwilling to discard many
models, implying that the cloud of models surrounding the approximating model is large. In this
case, it is easier for the consumer to distinguish the two models (see Appendix 7.2 for the detailed
calibration procedure using the value of p).
Using the data set documented in Campbell (2003), we set the parameter values for the pro-
cesses of returns, volatility, and consumption as follows: µ = 0.08, r = 0.02, δ = 0.02, and
σe = 0.156. For the labor income process, we follow Wang (2009) and set that σy = 0.1. When
ρ = 0, i.e., when labor income follows a Brownian motion, we can compute that σs = 5. Figure 1
illustrates how DEP (p) varies with the value of ϑ for different values of γ. We can see from the fig-
ure that the stronger the preference for robustness (higher ϑ), the less the p is. For example, when
γ = 2, p = 10% when ϑ = 1.4, while p = 16% when ϑ = 1.30 Both values of p are reasonable as
argued in AHS (2002), HSW (2002), Maenhout (2004), and Hansen and Sargent (Chapter 9, 2007).
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate how p varies with the value of ϑ for different values of σs and ρye,
respectively.31 These figures also show that the higher the value of ϑ, the less the p is. In addition,
30Caballero (1990) and Wang (2004) also set γ = 2.
31Note that since σs = σy/ (r + ρ), the value of σs can measure the persistence (ρ) and volatility
(
σy
)
of the labor
income process.
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to calibrate the same value of p, less values of σs (i.e., more volatile or higher persistent labor
income processes) or higher values of ρye lead to higher values of ϑ. The intuition behind this
result is that σs and ϑ have opposite effects on υ (this is clear from (64) in Appendix 7.2). To keep
the same value of p, if one parameter increases, the other one must reduce to offset its effect on
υ. As emphasized in Hansen and Sargent (2007), in the robustness model, p is the deep model
parameter governing the preference for RB, and ϑ reflects the effect of RB on the model’s behavior.
Combining these facts with the expression for robust portfolio rule, (15), we can see that an increase
in ρye not only reduces the hedging demand directly, but also reduces the standard speculation
demand of the risky asset by affecting the calibrated values of ϑ using the same values of p. In
contrast, an increase in σs reduces the hedging demand, but increases the speculation demand. It
is worth noting that in the RB model p can be used to measure the amount of model uncertainty,
whereas ϑ is used to measure the degree of the agent’s preference for RB. If we keep p constant
when recalibrating ϑ for different values of other parameters, the amount of model uncertainty is
held constant, i.e., the set of distorted models with which we surround the approximating model
does not change. In contrast, if we keep ϑ constant, p will change accordingly when the values of
other parameters change. In other words, the amount of model uncertainty is “elastic” and will
change accordingly when the fundamental factors change.
From the expression for robust portfolio rule, (15), we can see that plausible values of RB can
significantly affect the share invested in the risky asset. Figure 4 shows how the robust portfolio
rule varies with the degree of RB for different values of ρye. It clearly shows that α∗ decreases with
the value of ϑ for different values of ρye. In addition, it is also clear from the same figure that α∗
decreases with ρye for a given value of ϑ. The intuition behind this result is the same as that in the
FI-RE case: When the labor income risk becomes more positively correlated with the shock to the
equity return, the equity is less desirable and the agent thus invests less in it.
Figure 4 also illustrates how the precautionary saving demand (Γ) varies with the degree of RB
for different values of ρye. It clearly shows that Γ increases with the value of ϑ for different values of
ρye and RB has a very significant impact on precautionary savings. For example, when ρye = 0.35,
Γ = 0.63 when ϑ = 1, while Γ = 0.96 when ϑ = 1.4. Furthermore, we can see that Γ decreases
with ρye for a given value of ϑ. The intuition for this result is that the higher the value of ρye, the
more important the hedging demand for the equity, and thus the less demand for precautionary
savings.
4. Incorporating State Uncertainty
4.1. Information-Processing Constraint
So far we have considered the case in which the consumer can observe the state perfectly. In this
section, we consider a situation in which the typical consumer with the preference for robust-
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ness cannot observe the state (s) perfectly due to finite information-processing capacity (rational
inattention, or RI). In other words, the typical consumer can neither observe st nor can he or she
observe the source of innovation dBt, included in the state transition equation, (4):
dst = (rst − ct + piαt) dt + σdBt. (22)
Following Kasa (2006) and Reis (2011), we assume that the consumer observes only a noisy signal
containing imperfect information about st:
ds∗t = stdt + dξt, (23)
where ξt is the noise shock, and is a Brownian motion with mean 0 and variance Λ (in the RI
setting, the variance, Λ, is a choice variable for the agent). Note that here we assume that the
consumer receives signals on stdt rather than on dst. As emphasized in Sims (1998) and discussed
in Kasa (2006) and Reis (2011), the latter specification is not suitable to model state uncertainty
due to finite capacity because this specification means that in any finite interval, arbitrarily large
amounts of information can be passed through the consumer’s channel. In addition, following the
RI literature, we assume that ξt is independent of the Brownian motion governing the fundamental
shock, Bt.32
To model RI due to finite capacity, we follow Sims (2003) and impose the following constraint
on the consumer’s information-processing ability:
H (st+∆t|It)−H (st+∆t|It+∆t)≤ κ∆t, (24)
where κ is the consumer’s information channel capacity; H (st+∆t|It) denotes the entropy of the
state prior to observing the new signal at t+ ∆t; andH (st+∆t|It+∆t) is the entropy after observing
the new signal. κ imposes an upper bound on the amount of information – that is, the change
in the entropy – that can be transmitted in any given period. Formally, entropy is defined as
the expectation of the negative of the (natural) log of the density function of a random variable s,
−E [ln ( f (s))]. For example, the entropy of a discrete distribution with equal weight on two points
is simply E [ln2 ( f (X))] = −0.5 ln (0.5)− 0.5 ln (0.5) = 0.69, and the unit of information contained
in this distribution is 0.69 “nats” or 1 bit.33 In this case, an agent can remove all uncertainty about
s if the capacity devoted to monitoring s is κ = 1 bit. Since imperfect observations on the state lead
to welfare losses, the information-processing constraint must be binding. In other words, rational
investors use all of their channel capacity, κ, to reduce the uncertainty upon new observations. To
32In the traditional signal extraction literature, sometimes it is assumed that the fundamental shock and the noise
shock (or measure errors) are correlated. In real systems, we do observe correlated shocks and noises. See Stengel
(Chapter 4, 1994) for a discussion on correlated process and measurement noise.
33For alternative bases for the logarithm, the unit of information differs; with log base 2 the unit of information is the
“bit” and with base 10 it is a “dit” or a “hartley.”
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apply this information constraint to the state transition equation, we first rewrite (22) in the time
interval of [t, t + ∆t]:34
st+∆t = ρ0,t + ρ1st + ρ2
√
∆tεt+∆t, (25)
where ρ0,t = (−ct + piαt) (1− exp (r∆t)) / (−r∆t), ρ1 = exp (r∆t), ρ2 = σ
√
(1− exp (2r∆t)) / (−2r∆t),
and εt+∆t is the time-(t + ∆t) standard normal distributed innovation to permanent income. Tak-
ing conditional variances on both sides of (25) and substituting it into (24), we have
ln
(
ρ21Σt + ρ
2
2
)− ln (Σt+∆t) = 2κ∆t, (26)
which reduces to
·
Σt = 2 (r− κ)Σt + σ2,
as ∆t → 0, where Σt = Et
[
(st − ŝt)2
]
the conditional variance at t (see Appendix 7.3 for a proof).
In the steady state in which
·
Σt = 0, the steady state conditional variance can be written as:35
Σ =
σ2
2 (κ − r) . (27)
To make optimal decisions, the consumer is required to filter in the optimal way the value of st
using the observed s∗t . Although the setting of our CARA-Gaussian model is not a typical tracking
problem, the filtering problem in this model could be similar to the tracking problem proposed in
Sims (2003, 2010). Specifically, we may think that the model with imperfect state observations can
be decomposed into a two-stage optimization procedure:36
1. The optimal filtering problem determines the optimal evolution of the perceived (estimated)
state;
2. The optimal control problem in which the decision makers treat the perceived state as the
underlying state when making optimal decisions.
Here we assume ex post Gaussian distributions and Gaussian noise but adopt exponential or
CARA preferences. See Peng (2004), Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009, 2010), and Mondria
(2010) for this specification. Because both the optimality of ex post Gaussianity and the standard
Kalman filter are based on the linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) specification, the applications of
these results in the RI models with CARA preferences are only approximately valid.
34Note that here we use the fact that ∆Bt = εt
√
∆t, where ∆Bt represents the increment of a Wiener process.
35Note that here we need to impose the restriction κ− r > 0. If this condition fails, the state is not stabilizable and the
conditional variance diverges.
36See Liptser and Shiryayev (2001) for a textbook treatment on this topic and an application in a precautionary saving
model in Wang (2004).
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In stage 1, consumers need to estimate the unobserved state (st) using its prior distribution and
all processed and available information (i.e., their noisy observations, Ft=
{
s∗j
}t
j=0
). Specifically,
consumers rationally compute the conditional distribution of the unobserved state and represent
the original optimization problem as a Markovian one. Given the Gaussian prior s0 ∼ N (ŝ0,Σ0),
finding the posterior distribution of st becomes a standard filtering problem that can be solved us-
ing the Kalman-Bucy filtering method. Specifically, the optimal estimate for st given Ft=
{
s∗j
}t
j=0
in the mean square sense coincides with the conditional expectation: ŝt = Et [st], where Et [·] is
based on Ft. Applying Theorem 12.1 in Liptser and Shiryaev (2001), we can obtain the filtering
differential equations for ŝt and Σt as follows:
dŝt = (rŝt − ct + piαt) dt + Ktdηt, (28)
·
Σt = −ΛK2t + 2rΣt + σ2, (29)
given s0 ∼ N (ŝ0,Σ0), where
Kt =
Σt
Λ
(30)
is the Kalman gain and
dηt =
√
ΛdB∗t , (31)
with mean E [dηt] = 0 and var (dηt) = Λdt, where B∗t is a standard Brownian motion and Λ is to
be determined. Note that ηt is a Brownian motion with mean 0. Although the Brownian variable,
ξt, is not observable, the innovation process, ηt, is observable because it is derived from observable
processes (i.e., ds∗t and (rŝt − ct + piαt) dt). In this case, the path of the conditional expectation, ŝt,
is generated by the path of the innovation process, ηt. In the steady state, we have the following
proposition:
Proposition 4. Given finite capacity κ, in the steady state, the evolution of the perceived state can be written
as:
dŝt = (rŝt − ct + piαt) dt + σ̂dB∗t , (32)
where
σ̂ ≡ Σ/
√
Λ = f (κ) σ, (33)
f (κ) =
√
κ
κ−r > 1 (i.e., the standard deviation of the estimated state is greater than that of the true state),
Λ =
σ2
4κ (κ − r) (34)
is the steady state conditional variance, and
K = 2κ (35)
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is the corresponding Kalman gain.
Proof. In the steady state in which
·
Σt = 0, substituting the definition of the Kalman gain, (30), into
−ΛK2t + 2rΣt + σ2 = 0 and using Σ = σ
2
2(κ−r) , we can easily obtain that:
Λ =
σ2
4κ (κ − r) and K = 2κ.
It is worth noting that the above RI case can be observationally equivalent to the traditional
signal extraction (SE) model with exogenously specified noises (i.e., the steady state variance of the
noise Λ or the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) σ2/Λ are specified exogenously) in the sense that they
lead to the same model dynamics when the signal-to-noise ratio and finite capacity satisfy some
restriction.37 In other words, RI can provide a microfoundation for the exogenously specified SNR
in the traditional SE models.
In the RI literature, to explain the observed aggregate fluctuations and the effects of monetary
policy on the macroeconomy, the calibrated values of K are well below 1 (the FI-RE case). For
example, Adam (2007) found K = 0.4 bits based on the response of aggregate output to monetary
policy shocks. Luo (2008) found that if K = 0.5 bits, the otherwise standard permanent income
model generates realistic relative volatility of consumption to income.
4.2. Interaction between Model Uncertainty and State Uncertainty
In this section, we assume that the typical consumer not only cannot observe the state perfectly,
but also has concerns about the innovation to perceived permanent income. In the model with
both state uncertainty and model uncertainty, the prior variance of s, σ2, is affected by the optimal
portfolio choice, α∗, which is to be determined after solving the whole model with both model
uncertainty (ϑ) and state uncertainty (κ or SNR). Given the value of κ, the value of the variance
of the noise (Λ) should also be endogenously determined by α∗. The following is the two-stage
procedure to solve the optimization problem of the consumer under both model uncertainty (MU)
and state uncertainty (SU):
1. First, given finite SNR, we guess that the optimal portfolio choice under MU and SU is time-
invariant, i.e., αt = α. Consequently, σ =
√
σ2e α
2 + σ2s + 2ρyeσsσeα is also time-invariant. The
consumer with imperfect information about the state (SNR > 0) understands that he or she
cannot observe st perfectly and needs to use the Kalman filter, (28), to update the perceived
state when making decisions. In other words, (28) is regarded as the approximating model
37See Appendix 7.5 for the detailed discussion.
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in this MU-SU model. The consumer solves the following HJB:
sup
ct,α
inf
υt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (ŝt) +D J (ŝt) + υ (ŝt) σ2 Js + 12ϑ (ŝt)υ (ŝt)
2 σ2
]
, (36)
subject to the distorted model:
dŝt = (rŝt − ct + piα) dt + σ̂
(
σ̂υ (ŝt) dt + dB˜t
)
, (37)
where σ̂ ≡ f (κ) σ and f (κ) =
√
κ
κ−r > 1, and the transversality condition (TVC), limt→∞ E |exp (−δt) J (ŝt)| =
0, holds.
2. Second, after solving for optimal consumption and portfolio rules under RB and RI, we can
verify whether or not the resulting portfolio rule is time-variant. If yes, our guess in the
first step is correct and can thus rationalize the above procedure that we used to derive the
stochastic property of the endogenous noise,Λ. The key reason is that time-invariant α yields
time-invariant variance of the fundamental shock (σ).
The following proposition summarizes the solution to (36)-(37):
Proposition 5. Given ϑ and K, the optimal consumption and portfolio rules under robustness are
c∗t = rŝt +
δ− r
rγ
+
pi2
2rγσ2e
− piρyeσsσe
σ2e
− Γ (38)
and
α∗ =
pi
rγ˜ f (κ) σ2e
− ρyeσsσe
σ2e
, (39)
respectively, where ŝt is governed by (37), we use the fact that σ̂2 = f (κ)
2 σ2, and γ˜ ≡ (1+ ϑ) γ, and the
precautionary savings premium, Γ, is
Γ =
1
2
rγ˜ f (κ)2
(
1− ρ2ye
)
σ2s . (40)
Finally, the worst possible distortion can be written as υ∗ = −rγϑ.
Proof. See Appendix 7.4.
From (38), it is clear that robustness does not change the marginal propensity to consume
(MPC) out of perceived permanent income (ŝt), but affects the amount of precautionary savings. In
other words, in the continuous-time setting, consumption is not sensitive to unanticipated income
shocks. This conclusion is different from that obtained in the discrete-time robust-LQG perma-
nent income model in which the MPC is increased via the interaction between RB and income
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uncertainty, and consumption is more sensitive to unanticipated shocks.38
Given (38)-(40), it is straightforward to show that the observational equivalence between the
discount rate and the RB parameter no longer holds in the MU-SU model. The reason is the same
as that in the model without SU: ϑ affects optimal portfolio choice via increasing γ˜, whereas δ
does not enter the portfolio rule. In other words, although both the discount factor (exp (−δ))
and γ increase the precautionary savings premium and their observational equivalence can be
established in the sense that they generate the same value of Γ, they imply different portfolio
choices. Comparing (14) with (38), it is clear that the certainty equivalence principle holds in this
model, i.e., the consumption function under SU can be easily obtained by replacing the true state
with the perceived state.
Expression (39) shows that finite capacity (κ) affects the speculation demand invested in the
risky asset (the first term in (39)). Given that f (κ) =
√
κ/ (κ − r) > 1, we can see that SU reduces
the share invested in the risky asset. The intuition behind this result is that consumption reacts to
the income and asset return shocks gradually and with delay due to extracting useful information
about the true state from noisy observations. In other words, SU and MU affect the optimal port-
folio choice in the same direction. Figure 5 illustrates how strategic portfolio rule (α∗) varies with
the degree of SU (κ) for different plausible values of γ. It clearly shows that α∗ decreases with
the value of κ for any given value of γ. In addition, it is also clear from the same figure that α∗
decreases with γ for a given value of κ, which is consistent with the result obtained in the model
without SU.
Expression (40) shows that the precautionary savings demand increases with the degree of SU
governed by f (κ). Figure 5 also illustrates how the precautionary saving demand (Γ) varies with
the degree of SU for different plausible values of γ. It clearly shows that Γ increases with the value
of κ for different values of γ, and SU has a significant impact on precautionary savings.
As in the previous section, we use the elasticities of precautionary saving to changes in the
degrees of MU and SU as a measure of their importance. Specifically, using (40), we have the
following proposition:
Proposition 6. The relative sensitivity of precautionary saving to model uncertainty (MU, ϑ) and state
uncertainty (SU, κ) can be measured by:
µϑκ ≡ − eϑeκ =
ϑ
1+ ϑ
κ − r
r
, (41)
where eϑ ≡ ∂Γ/Γ∂ϑ/ϑ and eκ ≡ ∂Γ/Γ∂κ/κ are the elasticities of precautionary saving to model uncertainty and state
38See HST (1999) and Luo and Young (2010) for detailed discussions on how RB affects consumption and precaution-
ary savings in the discrete-time LQG permanent income models.
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uncertainty, respectively. Furthermore, when
κ < (≥) r
(
2+
1
ϑ
)
,
the precautionary saving demand is more sensitive to state uncertainty than model uncertainty. In other
words, when finite capacity is sufficiently low, the precautionary saving demand becomes more sensitive to
state uncertainty.
Proof. The proof is straightforward using (41) and the facts that µϑκ ≡
(
∂Γ/Γ
∂ϑ˜/ϑ˜
∂ϑ˜/ϑ˜
∂ϑ/ϑ
)
/
(
∂Γ/Γ
∂ f / f
∂ f / f
∂κ/κ
)
,
where ϑ˜ = 1+ ϑ.
Using (41), it is straightforward to show that:
∂µϑκ
∂ϑ
> 0 and
∂µϑκ
∂κ
> 0,
which mean that µϑκ is increasing with the degree of RB, ϑ, while is decreasing with the degree of
SU (i.e., less values of κ).
Using (38) and (39), we can obtain the stochastic properties of the joint dynamics of consump-
tion, labor income, and the equity return. The following proposition summarizes the major results
on the effects of RB on the joint behavior of consumption, labor income, and the equity return:
Proposition 7. Given ϑ and κ, the expected growth of consumption is:
gc ≡ E [dc
∗
t ]
dt
= −δ− r
rγ
+
1
2
r f (κ)2 γ˜
(
1− ρ2ye
)
σ2s +
pi2
2r f (κ) γ˜σ2e
, (42)
the volatility of consumption growth is var (dc∗t ) = r2 f (κ)
2 σ2, where σ is given in (5) and α∗ is given in
(39), the relative volatility of consumption growth to income growth is:
µ ≡ sd (dc
∗
t )
sd (dyt)
=
r f (κ)
r + ρ
√
1− ρ2ye +
[
pi (r + ρ)
γ˜σeσy
]2
, (43)
and the contemporaneous correlation between consumption growth and the equity return is:
ρcy ≡ corr (dc∗t , dyt) = f (κ)
(
1− ρ2ye
)
σs + piρye/ (rγ˜σe)√(
1− ρ2ye
)
σ2s + pi
2/ (rγ˜σe)
2
. (44)
Proof. See Appendix 7.4.
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Expression (42) clearly shows that both RB and RI can affect the expected consumption growth
by interacting with two sources of fundamental uncertainty: (i) labor income uncertainty
(
σ2s
)
and
(ii) asset return uncertainty
(
σ2e
)
. Specifically, we have
∂gc
∂ϑ
> 0 if ϑ >
pi
rγ
√
f (κ)3
√
1− ρ2yeσsσe
− 1.
Using the same parameter values above, we can compute that RB can increase the expected growth
rate if ϑ is greater than 0.4 when κ = 0.1 (here we set ρye = 0.18). In contrast, RB can increase the
expected growth rate if ϑ is greater than 0.76 when κ = 0.3. Furthermore, we have
∂gc
∂κ
< 0 if κ > κ ≡ r
1−
{
pi2/
[
2 (rγ˜)2
(
1− ρ2ye
)
σ2s σ
2
e
]}−2/3 .
Because κ is negative for the plausible parameter values, SU (less κ) can always increase the ex-
pected growth rate (see Figure 6).
From Expression (43), we can see that RB reduces the relative volatility of consumption growth
to income growth by increasing γ˜ and reducing the optimal share invested in the risky asset. This
result is different from that obtained in the permanent income model in which RB increases the
relative volatility of consumption growth to income growth by strengthening the consumption
sensitivity to income shocks.39 It is also clear from (43) that SU measured by f (κ) increases the rel-
ative volatility. This effect is similar to that obtained in the discrete-time permanent income model
(see Luo (2008) for a proof on how SU due to RI increases the relative volatility of consumption
growth to income growth at the individual level). Figure 6 illustrates how gc varies with the degree
of SU (κ) for different plausible values of γ. It is clear from the figure that the quantitative impact
of SU on gc is much stronger than that of MU on gc.
Since
∣∣ρye∣∣ ≤ 1, we have:
∂ρcy
∂ϑ
> 0,
which means that RB raises the contemporaneous correlation between consumption growth and
income growth. In addition, ρcy = 1√
1+pi2/(rγ˜σsσe)
2 when labor income is purely idiosyncratic, i.e.,
ρye = 0, while ρcy = 1 when the income risk and the return risk are perfectly correlated. From (44),
it is obvious that SU increases ρcy (see Figure 6).
39See Luo and Young (2010) for a proof that RB worsens the PIH model’s prediction on the relative volatility of
consumption growth to income growth.
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4.3. Quantitative Implications
In this section, we adopt the same calibration procedure as in the last section to calibrate the value
of ϑ for a given DEP, p, in the MU-SU model.40 Using the same parameter values as in the last
section, Figure 7 illustrates how p varies with the value of ϑ for different values of κ. We can see
from the figure that the stronger the preference for robustness (higher ϑ), the less the p is. Tables
1 and 2 report how different values of κ affect calibrated values of ϑ, optimal allocation in the
risky asset (α∗), the relative importance of the income hedging demand to the speculation demand
(
∣∣α∗h∣∣ /α∗s ), and precautionary saving demand (Γ) for different values of ρye and σs, respectively.41
Specifically, for given values of σs and ρye, when κ decreases (i.e., more information-constrained),
the calibrated value of ϑ increases; consequently, the optimal share invested in the risky asset
decreases and the relative importance of the income hedging demand to the speculation demand
increases. In addition, the precautionary saving demand decreases with the value of κ.
From Table 1, we can see that for given values of κ, the precautionary saving demand decreases
with the correlation between the equity return and labor income risk (ρye), holding other factors
constant, which is consistent with what we obtained in the MU model. The intuition is that the
higher the correlation coefficient, the less demand for the risky asset and thus precautionary sav-
ing. In Table 2, we can see that as labor income becomes more volatile, the optimal allocation in
the risky asset increases and the precautionary saving demand decreases. The reason is that the
higher the value of σs, the less the calibrated value of ϑ, holding other factors fixed; consequently,
the effective coefficient of absolute risk aversion decreases, and thus the optimal share increases
and the precautionary saving demand decreases.
4.4. Empirical Implications
As discussed in Haliassos and Michaelides (2000) and Campbell (2006), the empirical evidence on
the correlation between labor income and equity returns for different population groups is difficult
to reconcile with the observed stockholding behavior. Davis and Willen (1999) estimated that the
correlation is between 0.1 and 0.3 for college-educated males and is only about−0.25 for male high
school dropouts. Heaton and Lucas (1999) found that the correlation between the entrepreneurial
risk and the equity return was about 0.2. Since negative correlation between earnings and equity
returns implies increased willingness to invest in the risky asset, less educated investors should be
more heavily invested in the stock market while college graduates and entrepreneurs should put
less wealth in the stock market. In contrast, the empirical evidence on stock market participation
shows a significant correlation between the education level and stockholding. For example, Table
3 in Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) showed that the share invested in the stock market is substan-
40See Appendix 7.6 for the detailed calibration procedure in this case.
41Here the values of ρye are set to be 0, 0.18, and 0.35 according to Campbell and Viceira (Chapter 6, 2002), and the
values of σy are chosen to be the same as those used in Wang (2009).
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tially larger among those with at least a college degree compared to those with less than a high
school education at all income levels.42 Furthermore, for any given education group, the share in-
vested in the stock market is increasing with the income percentile. In other words, people with
the same educational attainment level and higher income invest more in the stock market. They
also mentioned that more educated groups have higher information-processing capacities.43 This
empirical evidence is consistent with our limited capacity theory. People with low income own
less distraction-saving goods and services at home (e.g., they cannot afford a good baby sitter);
consequently, they invested less in the stock market because they face greater state uncertainty.44
In addition, people with higher education may have more efficient information-processing ability
and thus face lower transition errors, which leads to higher effective channel capacity. Finally, peo-
ple with higher education probably have more and better knowledge about the model economy,
and are thus less concerned about the model specification.45
Our model with both RB and RI can have the potential to reconcile the model with the em-
pirical evidence. Specifically, poorer and less well-educated investors probably face greater state
uncertainty and model uncertainty, respectively; consequently, they rationally choose to invest less
in the stock market even if the correlation between their labor income and equity returns is neg-
ative and they have stronger incentive to hedge against their earnings risk.46 For example, the
optimal amount invested in the risky asset (α∗) of a typical well-educated investor is 26.78 when
ϑ = 1.5, κ = 1, and ρye = 0.18.47 In contrast, the optimal amount invested in the risky asset (α∗)
of a typical less well-educated investor is 22.95 when ϑ = 3, κ = 0.1, and ρye = −0.25. In other
words, although the negative correlation between earnings and equity returns increases the will-
ingness of low-educated investors to invest in the risky asset, well-educated investors invest more
wealth in the risky asset because they have more knowledge about the structure of the model and
higher information-processing capacities, and face less model uncertainty and state uncertainty.
In summary, the introduction of induced uncertainty can offer a potential explanation for the two
seemingly contradictory observations: the correlation between labor income and equity returns
and the stockholding behavior of less educated and well-educated investors.
4.5. Policy Implications
In this section, we discuss the effect of changes in the labor income tax rate on investors’ precau-
tionary saving and strategic portfolio choice under MU and SU. Elmendorf and Kimball (2000)
42Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) obtained the similar result using the PSID data.
43See their brief discussion on this in Section II.C.
44As argued in Banerjee and Mullainathan (2008), attention is a scarce resource that is important for labor productivity
and income distribution.
45Although both of the factors, education and income, affect model and state uncertainty facing investors, it seems that
education is more important in affecting model uncertainty and income is more important in affecting state uncertainty.
46As documented in Campbell (2006), there is some evidence that households understand their own limitations and
constraints, and avoid investment opportunities for which they feel unqualified.
47In this section, we also set µ = 0.08, r = 0.02, σs = 5, and σe = 0.156.
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found that given decreasing absolute prudence (e.g., CRRA utility), even when labor income risk
increases overall saving, it tends to lower investment in the risky asset. They also argued that
realistic increases in the marginal tax rate on labor income can cause large enough reductions in
the after-tax labor income risk, which leads to significant increases in investment in the risky asset.
Using the same policy experiment conducted as in their paper, we also consider the situation in
which the marginal tax rate on labor income (τ) is increased from 0 to 10%. In this case, the labor
income risk measured by (1− τ) σy is reduced from σy to 0.9σy. Using the expressions for opti-
mal portfolio choice and precautionary saving, (39) and (40), it is clear that the change in the tax
rate leads to an increase in the risky investment and a reduction in precautionary savings, holding
other parameter values fixed.
Specifically, when the labor income risk is reduced from σy to 0.9σy, the value of human wealth
is also reduced from σs to 0.9σs. Consequently, Γ is reduced from 0.5rγ˜ f (κ)
2
(
1− ρ2ye
)
σ2s to about
0.4rγ˜ f (κ)2
(
1− ρ2ye
)
σ2s . The presence of induced uncertainty measured by (1+ ϑ) f (κ)
2 > 1 can
amplify the impact of this taxation policy on the precautionary saving demand. For example,
when r = 0.02, ϑ = 1.5 and κ = 0.2, (1+ ϑ) f (κ)2 = 2.78. In other words, the policy impact on
precautionary saving is almost tripled under MU and SU.
From (39), it is clear that the labor income risk does not directly interact with induced uncer-
tainty due to the interaction of RB and RI because σs does not enter the standard speculation de-
mand function and the induced uncertainty term ((1+ ϑ) f (κ)) does not enter the income-hedging
demand function. However, the presence of induced uncertainty can offset the impact of the taxa-
tion policy on the optimal risky investment when ρye is positive. The reason is that the taxation pol-
icy reduces the hedging demand while the presence of induced uncertainty reduces the standard
speculation demand. Therefore, the policy impact on optimal portfolio choice can be mitigated
under MU and SU.
5. Comparison with Incomplete Information about Individual Labor Income
In this section, we consider another widely-adopted type of informational frictions: incomplete in-
formation about the income process, and compare its implications for robustly strategic consumption-
portfolio rules implications with that of RI we considered in the preceding section.48 Specifically,
following Muth (1960), Quah (1990), Pischke (1995), and Wang (2004), we assume that where there
are two individual components in the income process, agents can only observe the total income
but have no way to distinguish the two individual components. Mathematically, we assume that
labor income (yt) has two distinct components (y1,t and y2,t):
yt = y1,t + y2,t,
48Muth (1960) first considered this type of incomplete information when exploring the link between rational expecta-
tions and the geometrically declining weighted sum of past and current incomes.
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where
dy1,t = (µ1 − ρ1y1,t) dt + σ1dB1,t, (45)
dy2,t = (µ2 − ρ2y2,t) dt + ρ12σ2dB1,t +
√
1− ρ12σ2dB2,t, (46)
and ρ12 is the instantaneous correlation between the two individual components, y1,t and y2,t.49
All the other notations are similar to what we used in our benchmark model. Without a loss of
generality, we assume that ρ1 < ρ2 and σ1 > σ2. In other words, the first income component is
more persistent and volatile than the second component.50 It is straightforward to show that if
both components in the income process are observable, this model is essentially the same as our
benchmark model with a univariate income process. In this incomplete-information case, we need
to use the filtering technique to obtain the best estimates of the unobservable income components
first and then solve the optimization problem given the estimated income components. Following
the same technique adopted in Wang (2004), in the steady state in which the conditional variance-
covariance matrix is constant, we can obtain the following updating equations for the conditional
means of (y1,t, y2,t):
d
(
ŷ1,t
ŷ2,t
)
=
(
µ1 − ρ1ŷ1,t
µ2 − ρ2ŷ2,t
)
dt +
(
σ̂1
σ̂2
)
dZt, (47)
where ŷi,t = Et [yi,t] for i = 1, 2, dZt ≡ {dyt − [(µ1 + µ2) + (ρ2 − ρ1) ŷ1,t − ρ2yt] dt} /σ is a “con-
structed” innovation process using total income and the perceived individual components; Zt is
a standard Brownian motion; and σ =
√
σ21 + 2σ12 + σ
2
2 . σ̂1 and σ̂2 are the standard deviations of
dŷ1,t and dŷ2,t respectively:
σ̂1 =
1
σ
[
(ρ2 − ρ1)Σ11 + σ21 + σ12
]
and σ̂2 =
1
σ
[− (ρ2 − ρ1)Σ11 + σ22 + σ12] ,
where
Σ11 =
1
(ρ2 − ρ1)2
(√
Θ2 + σ21σ
2
2 (ρ2 − ρ1)2
(
1− ρ212
)−Θ) (48)
is the steady state conditional variance of y1,t, Θ = ρ1σ22 + ρ2σ
2
1 + (ρ1 + ρ2) σ12, and σ12 = ρ12σ1σ2.
51
It is worth noting that for this bi-variate Gaussian income specification, Σ11 can fully characterize
49Muth (1960), Quah (1990), and Pischke (1995) considered a more special two-component income specification (one
component is iid, and the other component is a random walk) in a discrete-time setting. Specifically, Quah (1990)
showed that this two-component income specification provides a potential resolution to the excess smoothness puzzle
in the standard permanent income model if the relative importance of transitory to permanent components is large.
50We may think of the first and second components as the aggregate (and persistent) and idiosyncratic (and transitory)
components, respectively.
51The detailed derivation of the expression for Σ11 is similar to that in Wang (2004) and is available from the author
upon request. It is straightforward to show that when |ρ12| = 1 or ρ1 = ρ2, the values of Σ11 are constant and are
independent of the persistence and volatility parameters in the income processes.
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the estimation risk induced by partially observed income.52 Figure 8 illustrates how Σ11 varies
with ρ2 and σ2/σ1.53 It clearly shows that given the persistence and volatility coefficients of y1,t,
the estimation risk increases with the persistence and volatility of y2,t (i.e., the less ρ2 and the higher
σ2/σ1).
Following the same procedure that I used in the preceding sections, we can solve this IC model
with RB. The following proposition summarizes the solution to the above problem:
Proposition 8. Given ϑ, the optimal consumption-portfolio rules under RB and IC are:
c∗t = r
[
wt +
1
r + ρ1
(
ŷ1,t +
µ1
r
)
+
1
r + ρ2
(
ŷ2,t +
µ2
r
)]
(49)
+
[
1− 1
2
(
1+ ϑ/ (rγ)
1+ ϑ
)]
pi2
r (1+ ϑ) γσ2e
− piρey
σe
(
σ̂1
r + ρ1
+
σ̂2
r + ρ2
)
+Ψ− Γ,
α∗ =
pi
rγ (1+ ϑ) σ2e
− ρeyσe
σ2e
(
σ̂1
r + ρ1
+
σ̂2
r + ρ2
)
(50)
respectively, where Ψ = (δ− r) / (rγ) captures the dissavings effect of relative impatience, and
Γ =
1
2
rγ˜
(
1− ρ2ey
)( σ̂1
r + ρ1
+
σ̂2
r + ρ2
)2
(51)
is the precautionary savings demand, where γ˜ ≡ γ
(
1+ ϑrγ
)
.
Proof. See Online Appendix.
Comparing (39) with (50), it is clear that RI and IC have distinct implications on robustly strate-
gic asset allocation. Specifically, RI affects the speculation demand invested in the risky asset via
f (κ) =
√
κ/ (κ − r) > 1, whereas IC has no impact on the speculation demand (the first term in
(50)). Furthermore, RI has no impact on the intertemporal hedging demand, whereas IC affects
this demand via changing the volatility of perceived permanent income
(
σ̂1
r+ρ1
+ σ̂2r+ρ2
)
. The main
reason behind these results is that RI is applied to the state variable s that summarizes all of the
relevant information in the state vector (w, y). In contrast, IC is only applied to the labor income
process, and consumers under IC can observe financial wealth perfectly.
52Note that the conditional variance-covariance matrix of
(
y1,t y2,t
)
can be written as:
Σ ≡
(
Σ11 Σ12
Σ21 Σ22
)
= E
[(
y1,t − ŷ1,t
y2,t − ŷ2,t
) (
y1,t − ŷ1,t y2,t − ŷ2,t
)]
=
(
1 −1
−1 1
)
Σ11.
53Here we set ρ1 = 0, σ1 = 0.05, and ρ12 = 0. In other words, the first income component is a unit root and the two
components are independent. The pattern of the figure does not change if these parameters change. The only exception
is the ρ12 = ±1 case. In this specification, Σ11 = 0 because the two components are perfectly correlted and the bivariate
income specification is essentially the same as the univariate income specification.
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Furthermore, comparing (40) with (51), we can see that RI and IC affect the precautionary sav-
ing demand via distinct channels. Specifically, RI increases precautionary savings by introducing
the f (κ) factor, whereas IC increases precautionary savings by increasing the variance of perceived
permanent income from
(
σ1
r+ρ1
)2
+ 2 ρ12σ1σ2
(r+ρ1)(r+ρ2)
+
(
σ2
r+ρ2
)2
to
(
σ̂1
r+ρ1
+ σ̂2r+ρ2
)2
.54
6. Conclusion
This paper has developed a tractable continuous-time CARA-Gaussian framework to explore how
induced uncertainty due to the interaction of RB and RI affects strategic consumption-portfolio
rules, precautionary savings, and consumption dynamics in the presence of uninsurable labor in-
come. Specifically, I explored the relative sensitivity of strategic consumption-portfolio rules and
precautionary savings with respect to the two types of induced uncertainty: (i) model uncertainty
due to robustness and (ii) state uncertainty due to limited information-processing capacity, as well
as risk aversion. In addition, I argued that both model uncertainty and state uncertainty are impor-
tant for us to understand and design optimal household portfolios. In particular, I found that these
two types of induced uncertainty reduce the optimal share invested in the risky asset, and thus can
offer a potential explanation for two seemingly contradictory observations in the data: the nega-
tive correlation between labor income and equity returns and the low stock market participation
rate of the less educated and lower income households.
7. Appendix
7.1. Solving the RB Model
The Bellman equation associated with the optimization problem is
J (st) = sup
ct,αt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct) + exp (−δdt) J (st+dt)
]
,
subject to (10), where J (st) is the value function. The HJB equation for this problem is then
0 = sup
ct,αt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (st) +D J (st)
]
,
54Note that
∆ ≡
(
σ̂1
r + ρ1
+
σ̂2
r + ρ2
)2
−
[(
σ1
r + ρ1
)2
+ 2
ρ12σ1σ2
(r + ρ1) (r + ρ2)
+
(
σ2
r + ρ2
)2]
= 2rΣ11
[
(ρ2 − ρ1)
(r + ρ1) (r + ρ2)
]2
> 0.
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where D J (st) = Js (rst − ct + piαt) + 12 Jss
(
σ2etα
2
t + σ
2
s + 2ρyeσsσeαt
)
. Under RB, the HJB can be writ-
ten as
sup
ct,αt
inf
υt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (st) +D J (st) + υ (st) σ2 Js + 12ϑ (st)υ (st)
2 σ2
]
subject to the distorting equation, (10). Solving first for the infimization part of the problem yields
υ∗ (st) = −ϑ (st) Js.
Given that ϑ (st) > 0, the perturbation adds a negative drift term to the state transition equation
because Js > 0. Substituting for υ∗ in the robust HJB equation gives:
sup
ct,αt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (st) + (rst − ct + piαt) Js + 12σ
2 Jss − 12ϑ (st) σ
2 J2s
]
. (52)
Performing the indicated optimization yields the first-order conditions for ct and αt:
ct = − 1
γ
ln (Js) , (53)
αt =
pi Js + ρyeσsσe
(
Jss − ϑJ2s
)
(ϑJ2s − Jss) σ2e
. (54)
Substitute (53) and (54) back into (52) to arrive at the partial differential equation
0 = − Js
γ
− δJ +
(
rst +
1
γ
ln (Js) + piαt
)
Js +
1
2
(
Jss − ϑt J2s
)
σ2, (55)
where σ2 = σ2e α2t + σ
2
s + 2ρyeσsσeαt. Conjecture that the value function is of the form
J (st) = − 1
α1
exp (−α0 − α1st) ,
where α0 and α1 are constants to be determined. Using this conjecture, we obtain that Js =
exp (−α0 − α1st) > 0 and Jss = −α1 exp (−α0 − α1st) < 0. Further more, we guess that ϑ (st) =
− ϑJ(st) =
α1ϑ
exp(−α0−α1st) > 0. (55) can thus be reduced to
−δ 1
α1
= − 1
γ
+
[
rst −
(
α0
γ
+
α1
γ
st
)
+
pi
(
pi − ρyeσsσeα1 (1+ ϑ)
)
(1+ ϑ) α1σ2e
]
− 1
2
α1 (1+ ϑ)
(
σ2e α
2
t + σ
2
s + 2ρyeσsσeαt
)
Collecting terms, the undetermined coefficients in the value function turn out to be
α1 = rγ, (56)
α0 =
δ
r
− 1+ pi
[
pi − ρyeσsσerγ (1+ ϑ)
]
(1+ ϑ) rσ2e
− 1
2
(1+ ϑ) rγ2
(
σ2e α
2
t + σ
2
s + 2ρyeσsσeαt
)
, (57)
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where α∗ = pi
(1+ϑ)γrσ2e
− ρyeσsσe
σ2e
. Substituting these back into the first-order condition (53) yields the
consumption function, (14), in the main text. Using (57) and σ2e α2t +σ
2
s + 2ρyeσsσeαt =
(
1− ρ2ye
)
σ2s +
pi2
(rγ˜)2σ2e
, we can obtain the expression for the precautionary savings premium, (16), in the main text.
When ρye = 1, we have
α0
γ
=
δ
r
− 1+ pi
[
pi − ρyeσsσerγ (1+ ϑ)
]
(1+ ϑ) rσ2e
− 1
2
(1+ ϑ) rγ2
(
σ2e α
2
t + σ
2
s + 2ρyeσsσeαt
)
=
δ− r
rγ
+
pi2
(1+ ϑ) γrσ2e
− piρyeσsσerγ (1+ ϑ)
(1+ ϑ) rγσ2e
− 1
2
(1+ ϑ) rγ
(
pi
(1+ ϑ) γrσe
)2
=
δ− r
rγ
+
pi2
2 (1+ ϑ) γrσ2e
− piσs
σe
Finally, we check if the investor’s transversality condition (TVC), limt→∞ E [exp (−δt) |J (st)|] =
0, is satisfied. Substituting the consumption-portfolio rules, c∗t and α∗, into the state transition
equation for st yields:
dst = Adt + σdBt,
where A = − δ−rrγ + pi
2
2rγσ2e
+ 12 rγ˜
(
1− ρ2ye
)
σ2s under the approximating model. This Brownian mo-
tion with drift can be rewritten as:
st = s0 + At + σ (Bt − B0) , (58)
where Bt − B0 ∼ N (0, t). Substituting (58) into E [exp (−δt) |J (st)|] yields:
E [exp (−δt) |J (st)|] = 1
α1
E [exp (−δt− α0 − α1st)]
=
1
α1
exp
(
E [−δ− α0 − α1st] + 12 var (α1st)
)
=
1
α1
exp
(
−δt− α0 − α1 (s0 + At) + 12α
2
1σ
2t
)
= |J (s0) | exp
(
−
(
δ+ α1A− 12α
2
1σ
2
)
t
)
where |J (s0) | = 1α1 exp (−α0 − α1s0) is a positive constant and we use the facts that st − s0 ∼
N
(
At, σ2t
)
. Therefore, the TVC is satisfied if and only if the following condition holds:
δ+ α1 A− 12α
2
1σ
2 = r +
pi2
2σ2e
+
1
2
(rγ)2
[
(1+ ϑ)
(
1− ρ2ye
)
σ2s −
(
σ2e α
2
t + σ
2
s + 2ρyeσsσeαt
)]
> 0. (59)
In the FI-RE case in which ϑ = 0, this condition reduces to: r+pi2/
(
2σ2e
)− (rγ)2 (ρyeσs + σeα∗)2 /2 >
0. Using the parameter values we consider in the text, it is straightforward to show that the TVC is
always satisfied in both the FI-RE and RB models. It is straightforward to show that the TVC still
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holds under the distorted model in which A = − δ−rrγ + pi
2
2rγσ2e
+ 12 rγ˜
(
1− ρ2ye
)
σ2s − rγϑσ2.
7.2. Calibrating the Robustness Parameter
The value of p is determined by the following procedure. Let model P denote the approximating
model, (4):
dst = (rst − ct + piαt) dt + σdBt,
and model Q be the distorted model, (10):
dst = (rst − ct + piαt) dt + σ (συ (st) dt + dBt) .
Define pP as
pP = Prob
(
ln
(
LQ
LP
)
> 0
∣∣∣∣ P) , (60)
where ln
(
LQ
LP
)
is the log-likelihood ratio. When model P generates the data, pP measures the
probability that a likelihood ratio test selects model Q. In this case, we call pP the probability of
the model detection error. Similarly, when model Q generates the data, we can define pQ as
pQ = Prob
(
ln
(
LP
LQ
)
> 0
∣∣∣∣Q) . (61)
Given initial priors of 0.5 on each model and that the length of the sample is N, the detection error
probability, p, can be written as:
p (ϑ; N) =
1
2
(pP + pQ) , (62)
where ϑ is the robustness parameter used to generate model Q. Given this definition, we can see
that 1− p measures the probability that econometricians can distinguish the approximating model
from the distorted model.
The general idea of the calibration procedure is to find a value of ϑ such that p (ϑ; N) equals
a given value (for example, 10%) after simulating model P, (4), and model Q, (10).55 In the
continuous-time model with the iid Gaussian specification, p (ϑ; N) can be easily computed. Be-
cause both models P and Q are arithmetic Brownian motions with constant drift and diffusion
coefficients, the log-likelihood ratios are Brownian motions and are normally distributed random
variables. Specifically, the logarithm of the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the distorted model (Q)
with respect to the approximating model (P) can be written as
ln
(
LQ
LP
)
= −
ˆ N
0
υdBs − 12
ˆ N
0
υ2ds, (63)
55The number of periods used in the calculation, N, is set to be the actual length of the data we study. For example, if
we consider the post-war U.S. annual time series data provided by Robert Shiller from 1946− 2010, T = 65.
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where
υ ≡ υ∗σ = −rγϑ
√
σ2e α
2 + σ2s + 2ρyeσsσeα. (64)
Similarly, the logarithm of the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the approximating model (P) with
respect to the distorted model (Q) is
ln
(
LP
LQ
)
=
ˆ N
0
υdBs +
1
2
ˆ N
0
υ2ds. (65)
Using (60)-(65), it is straightforward to derive p (ϑ; N):
p (ϑ; N) = Pr
(
x <
υ
2
√
N
)
, (66)
where x follows a standard normal distribution. From the expressions of υ, (64), and p (ϑ; N), (66),
we can show that the value of p is decreasing with the value of ϑ because ∂α∗/∂ϑ < 0.
7.3. Deriving Continuous-time IPC
The IPC,
ln
(
ρ21Σt + ρ
2
2
)− lnΣt+∆t = 2κ∆t,
can be rewritten as
ln
(
exp (2r∆t)Σt +
1− exp (2r∆t)
−2r∆t ∆tσ
2
)
− lnΣt+∆t = 2κ∆t,
which can be reduced to
Σt+∆t − Σt = [exp (2 (r− κ)∆t)− 1]Σt + exp (2 (r− κ)∆t)− exp (−2κ∆t)2r σ
2.
Dividing ∆t on both sides of this equation and letting ∆t → 0, we have the following updating
equation for Σt:
·
Σt = lim
∆t→0
Σt+∆t − Σt
∆t
= 2 (r− κ)Σt + σ2.
7.4. Solving the RB–RI Model
The Bellman equation associated with the optimization problem under SU is
J (ŝt) = sup
ct,αt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct) + exp (−δdt) J (ŝt+dt)
]
,
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subject to (37), where J (ŝt) is the value function. The HJB equation for this problem can thus be
written as
0 = sup
ct,αt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (ŝt) +D J (st)
]
,
where
D J (ŝt) = Jŝ (rŝt − ct + piαt) + 12 Jŝŝ f (κ)
2 (σ2e α2t + σ2s + 2ρyeσsσeαt) .
Here we use the facts that σ̂ ≡ f (κ) σ and σ =
√
σ2e α
2 + σ2s + 2ρyeσsσeα. Under MU and SU, the
HJB can be written as
sup
ct,αt
inf
υt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (ŝt) +D J (ŝt) + υ (ŝt) σ̂2 Jŝ + 12ϑ (st)υ (ŝt)
2 σ̂2
]
subject to the distorting equation, (37). Solving first for the infimization part of the problem yields:
υ∗ (ŝt) = −ϑ (ŝt) Jŝ. Given that ϑ (ŝt) > 0, the perturbation adds a negative drift term to the state
transition equation because Jŝ > 0. Substituting for υ∗ in the robust HJB equation gives:
sup
ct,αt
[
− 1
γ
exp (−γct)− δJ (ŝt) + (rŝt − ct + piαt) Jŝ + 12 σ̂
2 Jŝŝ − 12ϑ (ŝt) σ̂
2 J2ŝ
]
. (67)
Performing the indicated optimization yields the first-order conditions for ct and αt:
ct = − 1
γ
ln (Jŝ) , (68)
αt =
pi Jŝ/ f (κ) + ρyeσsσe
(
Jŝŝ − ϑJ2ŝ
)(
ϑJ2ŝ − Jŝŝ
)
σ2e
. (69)
Substitute (68) and (69) back into (67) to arrive at the partial differential equation
0 = − Jŝ
γ
− δJ +
(
rŝt +
1
γ
ln (Jŝ) + piαt
)
Jŝ +
1
2
f (κ)2
(
Jŝŝ − ϑt J2ŝ
)
σ2.
Conjecture that the value function is of the form
J (ŝt) = − 1
α1
exp (−α0 − α1ŝt) ,
where α0 and α1 are constants to be determined. Using this conjecture, we obtain Jŝ = exp (−α0 − α1ŝt) >
0 and Jŝŝ = −α1 exp (−α0 − α1ŝt) < 0. Furthermore, we guess that ϑ (ŝt) = − ϑJ(ŝt) =
α1ϑ
exp(−α0−α1 ŝt) >
0. Substituting these expressions into (55) yields:
−δ 1
α1
= − 1
γ
+
{
rŝt −
(
α0
γ
+
α1
γ
ŝt
)
+
pi
[
pi/ f (κ)− ρyeσsσeα1 (1+ ϑ)
]
(1+ ϑ) α1σ2e
}
− 1
2
f (κ)2 α1 (1+ ϑ)
(
σ2e α
2
t + σ
2
s + 2ρyeσsσeαt
)
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Collecting terms, the undetermined coefficients in the value function turn out to be
α1 = rγ, (70)
α0 =
δ− r
r
+
pi
[
pi/ f (κ)− ρyeσsσerα (1+ ϑ)
]
(1+ ϑ) rσ2e
− 1
2
r f (κ)2 (1+ ϑ) γ2
(
σ2e αt + σ
2
s + 2ρyeσsσeαt
)
.
(71)
Substituting (70) and (71) into (68) and (69) yields the optimal portfolio and consumption rule,
(39) and (38), respectively, in the main text. Using (71) and that fact that σ2e α2t + σ
2
s + 2ρyeσsσeαt =(
1− ρ2ye
)
σ2s +
pi2
r2γ˜2 f (κ)2σ2e
, we can obtain Expression (40) in the main text.
Using (38) and (39), we have dc∗t = rdŝt and var (dc∗t ) = r2 f (κ)
2 σ2. The relative volatility of
consumption growth to income growth can thus be written as
µ ≡ sd (dc
∗
t )
sd (dyt)
= r f (κ)
√
1− ρ2ye
(r + ρ)2
+
pi2
γ˜2σ2e σ
2
y
.
The contemporaneous covariance between consumption growth and income growth is
cov (dc∗t , dyt) = r f (κ) cov
(
α∗σedBe,t +
1
r + ρ
σydBy,t, σydBy,t
)
= r f (κ)
(
1
r + ρ
σ2y + α
∗ρyeσeσy
)
,
which implies that
ρcy ≡ corr (dc∗t , dyt) = f (κ)
σs + α∗ρyeσe
σ
.
Substituting σ =
√(
1− ρ2ye
)
σ2s +
pi2
(rγ˜)2 f (κ)2σ2e
and α∗ = pi
rγ˜ f (κ)2σ2e
− ρyeσsσe
σ2e
into this expression leads
to (44) in the main text.
Finally, using the derived consumption-portfolio rules and the value function, we can use
the same procedure as that in Appendix 7.1 to verify that the transversality condition (TVC),
limt→∞ E |exp (−δt) J (ŝt)| = 0, holds under RB and RI.
7.5. The Equivalence between Rational Inattention and Signal Extraction with Exogenous
Noises
Dividing Λ on both sides of (29), we obtain the following differential Riccati equation governing
the evolution of Kt:
·
Kt = −K2t + 2rKt +
σ2
Λ
, (72)
where σ2/Λ is the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) in this problem. In the steady state, we have the
following proposition for this signal extraction case with exogenous noises:
Proposition 9. Given SNR
(
σ2/Λ
)
, in the steady state, the evolution of the perceived state can be written
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as
dŝt = (rŝt − ct + piαt) dt + σ̂dB∗t ,
where
σ̂ ≡ K
√
Λ = g (τ) σ, (73)
K = r +
√
r2 +
σ2
Λ
, (74)
g (τ) ≡ r√τ + √1+ r2τ > 1, and τ ≡ 1/ SNR = Λ/σ2. Furthermore, if SNR and κ satisfy the
following equality:
SNR = 4κ (κ − r) ,
then the RI and SE cases are observationally equivalent in the sense that they lead to the same model dynam-
ics.
Proof. In the steady state in which
·
Kt = 0, solving the following algebraic Riccati equation,
−K2t + 2rKt +
σ2
Λ
= 0,
yields the steady state Kalman gain:
K = r +
√
r2 +
σ2
Λ
. (75)
and steady state conditional variance: Σ = KΛ.
7.6. Calibrating the Robustness Parameter in the RB-RI Model
In this MU-SU model, let model P denote the approximating model, (32) and model Q be the dis-
torted model, (37). Because both models P and Q are arithmetic Brownian motions with constant
drift and diffusion coefficients under MU-SU, the log-likelihood ratios are normally distributed
random variables. Consequently, the logarithm of the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the distorted
model (Q) with respect to the approximating model (P) can be written as
ln
(
LQ
LP
)
= −
ˆ N
0
υdBs − 12
ˆ N
0
υ2ds, (76)
where
υ ≡ υ∗σ̂ = −rγϑ
√
σ2e α
∗2 + σ2s + 2ρyeσsσeα∗. (77)
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Similarly, the logarithm of the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the approximating model (P) with
respect to the distorted model (Q) is
ln
(
LP
LQ
)
=
ˆ N
0
υdBs +
1
2
ˆ N
0
υ2ds. (78)
Given (76) and (78), it is straightforward to derive p (ϑ; N):
p (ϑ; N) = Pr
(
x <
υ
2
√
N
)
, (79)
where x follows a standard normal distribution.
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Table 1. Implications of the correlation on α∗ and Γ under MU and SU (p = 10%, σs = 5)
ρye = 0 ρye = 0.18 ρye = 0.35
κ = 0.1 ϑ 1.455 1.475 1.536
α∗ 22.46 16.51 10.52
α∗s 22.46 22.28 21.74
α∗h 0 −5.77 −11.22∣∣α∗h∣∣ /α∗s 0 0.259 0.516
Γ 1.534 1.497 1.391
κ = 0.2 ϑ 1.418 1.437 1.495
α∗ 24.18 18.23 12.22
α∗s 24.18 23.99 23.44
α∗h 0 −5.77 −11.22∣∣α∗h∣∣ /α∗s 0 0.240 0.479
Γ 1.364 1. 31 1.216
κ = 0.5 ϑ 1.396 1.415 1.47
α∗ 25.21 19.24 13.23
α∗s 25.21 25.01 24.45
α∗h 0 −5.77 −11.22∣∣α∗h∣∣ /α∗s 0 0.231 0.459
Γ 1.279 1.217 1.129
κ = 1 ϑ 1.389 1.407 1.462
α∗ 25.54 19.58 13.57
α∗s 25.54 25.35 24.78
α∗h 0 −5.77 −11.22∣∣α∗h∣∣ /α∗s 0 0.228 0.453
Γ 1.253 1.188 1.102
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Table 2. Implications of income uncertainty on α∗ and Γ under MU and SU (p = 10%, ρye = 0.18)
σs = 4 σs = 5 σs = 6
κ = 0.1 ϑ 1.770 1.475 1.265
α∗ 15.29 16.51 17.42
α∗s 19.90 22.28 24.34
α∗h −4.62 −5.77 −6.92∣∣α∗h∣∣ /α∗s 0.232 0.259 0.284
Γ 1.675 1.497 1.370
κ = 0.2 ϑ 1.715 1.437 1.238
α∗ 16.92 18.23 19.21
α∗s 21.54 23.99 26.13
α∗h −4.62 −5.77 −6.92∣∣α∗h∣∣ /α∗s 0.214 0.240 0.265
Γ 1. 460 1. 310 1. 203
κ = 0.5 ϑ 1.682 1.415 1.222
α∗ 17.90 19.24 20.26
α∗s 22.52 25.01 27.18
α∗h −4.62 −5.77 −6. 92∣∣α∗h∣∣ /α∗s 0.205 0.231 0.255
Γ 1. 352 1.217 1.120
κ = 1 ϑ 1.671 1.407 1.216
α∗ 18.23 19.58 20.61
α∗s 22.84 25.35 27.54
α∗h −4.62 −5.77 −6.92∣∣α∗h∣∣ /α∗s 0.202 0.228 0.251
Γ 1.319 1.188 1.094
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